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THE CLIENT-FRAUD DILEMMA: A NEED FOR CONSENSUS

I.

INTRODUCTION

If attorneys could create a perfect society, no client would ever
use an attorney's services for fraudulent or illegal purposes. But
experience has shown that clients occasionally do use an attorney's
services to aid in fraudulent or illegal activity.
The attorney who becomes aware of a client's misconduct faces
a serious dilemma. Disclosure of the client's wrongful behavior appears to violate "the pivotal element of the modern American lawyer's professional functions," ' i.e., the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality.2 On the other hand, the attorney who takes no action may create the impression of acquiescence in the client's activibetween
these two extremes.
Alternatives
exist
ties.'
Unfortunately, laypersons, legislators, scholars, and organizationsmost notably the American Bar Association (ABA)-have failed to
reach a clear consensus on the proper scope of the privilege of confidentiality in this context. This lack of agreement, itself indicative
of the dilemma's complexities, continues to leave attorneys without
a clear solution to the client-fraud dilemma.
The ABA recently affirmed its position that the attorney-client
privilege should greatly restrict an attorney's ability to disclose client misconduct. 4 In February 1983 the ABA House of Delegates
met to discuss the then-proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules).5 Proposed Model Rule 1.6 contained two provisions
that many cast as a radical assault on the traditional scope of the
attorney-client privilege. 6 The first provision would have allowed an
1. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
1061, 1061 (1978).
2. E.g., Note, Client Fraudand the Lawyer-An EthicalAnalysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89, 90
(1977). See also Taylor, Of Lawyers, Ethics and Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, § 3, at 4,
col. 3, ("[I]n practice, it is almost unheard of for an attorney to blow the whistle on a
client.").
3. Cf. Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate Misconduct, 36 Bus.
LAw. 239, 245 (1981) (arguing that the attorney's role as an officer of the court includes
a duty to work for the fair administration of justice).
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
5. Taylor, Lawyers Vote Against Disclosure of FraudulentActivity by Clients, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 8, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
6. See, e.g., Elliot, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Invention Not
Mothered by Necessity?, 54 CONN. B.J. 265 (1980) (asserting that proposed rules unnecessa-
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attorney to reveal client confidences in order to prevent "substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another." '7 The second provision sanctioned disclosure "to rectify the consequences of
a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the
lawyer's services have been used."' The House of Delegates rejected both proposals after a heated debate.' Nevertheless, debate
on these provisions continues as various state bar associations decide whether to adopt the Model Rules.'" This debate provides a
ready forum in which to fully analyze client misconduct and the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.
This comment examines client misconduct in a nonlitigation
setting and concludes that the ABA should re-evaluate its current
position on attorney-client confidentiality. The opening discussion
of O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., an actual example of the ethical
dilemma faced by a law firm when a major client engages in largescale fraud, provides a concrete foundation for the arguments for
and against disclosure of client wrongdoing. This comment examines the various solutions to the client-fraud dilemma proposed by
the common law and the legal profession. It also analyzes the forces
opposing the ABA's position on confidentiality and the effects those
forces have on the legal profession. Although this comment does
not purport to provide a solution to the dilemma, it concludes with
several suggestions for future consideration.
II.

THE STORY OF O.P.M.

The story of O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. (OPM)" illustrates
rily dilute attorney's effectiveness as champion for the client); Koskoff, Proposed New Code
of Professional Responsibility: 1984 Is Now!, 54 CONN. B.J. 260 (1980) (asserting that proposed draft code would place impossible judgmental burdens on attorneys and would
impair clients' willingness to disclose information).

7.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.6(b)(l) (Revised Final Draft

1982).
8. Id. at Rule 1.6(b)(2).
9. Taylor, supra note 5.
10. See 2 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) at 248 (July 23, 1986), 385 (Oct.
29, 1986), 494 (Jan. 7, 1987); Daily Record (Baltimore, Md.), Dec. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
On April 15, 1986, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 1987. See MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT (Supp. Aug.
1986). Maryland has in fact rejected Model Rule 1.6. It has adopted instead a rule
substantially identical to the draft rejected by the ABA in 1983. Maryland Rule 1.6 contains both of the controversial draft provisions quoted in the text above.

11. This story is told in

REPORT OF THE TRUSTEE CONCERNING FRAUD AND OTHER
re OPM Leasing

MISCONDUCT IN THE MANAGEMENT AND AFFAIRS OF THE DEBTOR (In

Servs., Inc., Bankr. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1983), reprintedwith modifications in M.
ITIES REGULATION

943-57 (1986) [hereinafter

TRUSTEE'S REPORT,

STEINBERG, SECUR-

with parallel citation in
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many of the issues that arise when a client uses the services of an
attorney to achieve fraudulent or illegal goals.' 2 Mordecai Weissman founded O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. in 1970; his boyhood
friend, Myron S. Goodman, soon joined him as a partner. The corporation began as a leasing service for all types of equipment but
soon specialized in the leasing of computers.' 3 OPM borrowed
money to purchase computers, leased the computers to customers,
then used the leases as security for further loans.' 4 This formula
appeared to work well. By 1977, large corporations such as AT&T,
General Motors, and Rockwell International leased multi-million
dollar computers from OPM. 15 The 1978 financial statements of
OPM showed healthy profits and created the image of OPM as a
"modern American success story."' 16
OPM's outward appearance of success and legitimacy did not,
however, correspond to reality. The corporation never actually
made money but rather relied on fraud and bribery to remain in
business.' 7 OPM used the same computers as security for several
different loans and paid large "commissions" to those willing to
steer business its way.' 8 As the corporation's financial outlook deteM. STEINBERG]. The meaning of the OPM initials is not entirely clear. Customers of
OPM were told that the initials stood for "other people's machines." Goodman and
Weissman ran the business almost exclusively on funds advanced by others, which
prompted the explanation of "other people's money" to the corporation's name. The
trustee who investigated the fraud noted a third interpretation of the initials: "other
people's mistakes." Id. at 16, M. STEINBERG at 943.
12. Similar examples of client fraud exist and would have served the purposes of this
comment adequately. See, e.g.,
A Question of Integrity at Blue-Chip Law Firms, Bus. WK., Apr.
7, 1986, at 76 (listing several examples of prestigious law firms facing charges connected
with a client's misconduct). OPM was selected because of the availability of information
concerning the fraud and the publicity the case has received. See generally R. GANDOSSY,
BAD BUSINESS: THE OPM SCANDAL AND THE SEDUCTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

(1985)

(discussing the OPM fraud); Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times,Jan. 9,
1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (same).
13. TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 16-17, M. STEINBERG at 944.
14. OPM actually engaged in transactions beyond the mere leasing of computers.
For example, the corporation sold "equity participations" in the equipment to investors
looking for tax shelters. For a general discussion of OPM's other business dealings, see
id.
15. Id.
16. The corporation's 1978 financial statements showed assets of over $412 million.
Id. at 17-18, M. STEINBERG at 945.
17. Taylor, supra note 12, at 32.
18. In addition to the fraud and bribery, OPM offered extremely favorable terms to
its customers. Although these favorable terms did not violate the law, they caused OPM
to lose money, thus creating the need for continued fraud. Id. Part of the continued
fraud involved a check kiting scheme engaged in between December 1978 and February
1979. In March 1980 OPM pleaded guilty to charges connected with this scheme.
TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 23, M. STEINBERG at 946.
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riorated in 1979, OPM resorted to massive fraud to remain in business.' 9 Through forged signatures and falsified documents OPM
inflated the value of computers and leases 20 to obtain otherwise unavailable loans from lending institutions. OPM's collapse in early
1981 revealed its fraudulent conduct, but not before the corporation had obtained over $196 million in loans based on fraudulent
leases. 2 The conduct of accountants, bankers, and management
consultants aided the OPM fraud,2 2 but this comment focuses only
on the conduct of OPM's attorneys.
The New York law firm of Singer, Hutner, Levine & Seeman
(Singer Hutner) represented OPM from 1971 until the firm voted to
withdraw as counsel in September 1980.23 The relationship between counsel and client initially benefited both parties. The firm
handled almost all aspects of OPM's legal affairs as well as the personal affairs of both Weissman and Goodman; OPM accounted for
over sixty percent of Singer Hutner's revenues. 2 4 One of the firm's
attorneys served as OPM's third director. 25 This close relationship
with and financial dependence on OPM magnified Singer Hutner's
dilemma once it discovered the fraud.2 6
Singer Hutner had knowledge in early 1979 that should have
alerted it to OPM's conduct.2 7 The firm made no apparent response
19. The financial deterioration in 1979 could be attributed to substantial developments in the computer field and the favorable terms of the leases. Taylor, supra note 12,
at 32.
20. Id. at 33. This massive fraud centered on leases that Rockwell International had
executed but did not intend to make effective. Goodman chose Rockwell for many reasons, including the fact that Rockwell's internal procedures made discovery of the fraud
unlikely. TRUSTrEE's REPORT, supra note 11, at 23, M. STEINBERG at 946.
21. Taylor, supra note 12, at 33.
22. TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 27, M. STEINBERG at 949-50.
23. OPM selected Singer Hutner as counsel in 1971, in part because Goodman had
grown up with the brother of Andrew B. Reinhard, then a Singer Hutner associate. The
Trustee was unable to conclusively determine Reinhard's role in the fraud. The Trustee
did believe that Reinhard was, at the least, a reluctant but knowing participant in the
fraud. Id. at 31-32, M. STEINBERG at 952.
24. Id. at 31, M. STEINBERG at 951. During the course of Singer Hutner's representation of OPM, the firm doubled its size to include 27 attorneys by 1980. Id.
25. Taylor, supra note 12, at 33. Reinhard was the attorney who served as OPM's
third director. Id.
26. TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 31, M. STEINBERG at 951. Goodman referred to the close relationship between client and counsel as a "bondage of the bookends." Id.
27. According to the Trustee's Report,
By early 1979 Singer Hutner had received indications that Goodman and
Weissman were capable of serious illegality. Some lawyers were aware that
Weissman and Goodman had engaged in lease fraud and commercial bribery,
and the firm knew that Goodman had recently perpetrated a $5 million check
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to this information until June 12, 1980, when Goodman first disclosed the possibility of past "wrongful transactions" he had committed on behalf of OPM. 8 The disclosure came during a meeting
at Singer Hutner's offices on the same day the firm received a letter
from OPM's chief in-house accountant revealing the lease fraud. 9
No one at Singer Hutner read the accountant's letter because Goodman somehow managed to "intercept" it.3 0 Goodman refused either
to return the letter or to fully disclose the fraud unless Singer
Hutner could promise complete confidentiality. 3 ' Citing its responsibilities to both OPM and Weissman, the law firm refused to make
such a promise.32 Singer Hutner did honor Goodman's request that
the firm meet with OPM's accountant and his counsel. At this meeting the accountant informed Singer Hutner that OPM had committed a multi-million dollar fraud, that the firm had unknowingly
assisted by drafting opinion letters based on false documents, and
that OPM probably needed to continue its fraudulent behavior to
remain in business.
Singer Hutner sought the advice of expert
outside counsel.
The firm retained the services ofJoseph McLaughlin and Henry
Putzel III to advise it on its legal and ethical duties in light of Goodman's disclosure. 34 McLaughlin and Putzel advised Singer Hutner
that it could continue to represent OPM if Goodman assured the
firm that all wrongdoing had ceased. 5 They also informed the firm
that it had neither the obligation nor the right to disclose the fraudulent leases since these leases were a past and completed fraud.
The experts advised the firm to seek a full disclosure from Goodkiting scheme. Singer Hutner also had knowledge of facts showing that OPM
was suffering severe cash shortages that provided a motive for further fraud.
Id. at 32, M. STEINBERG at 952.
28. Id. at 33, M. STEINBERG at 953. Weissman had also engaged in fraud on behalf of
OPM; however, Goodman appeared to be the mastermind of the large-scale fraud involving the Rockwell leases. See id. at 16-27, M. STEINBERG at 943-49.

29. Taylor, supra note 12, at 33.
30. What actually happened is unclear. Taylor's account states, "The lawyers
[Singer Hutner] say that Goodman snatched the letter unopened from Reinhard's hand
or seized it from the top of his desk. Goodman says that this was a 'cover story' agreed
upon between him and Reinhard .
Id.
31. Id.
32. Because the firm represented Weissman and OPM as well, a promise of complete
confidentiality to Goodman could have compromised the firm's representation of either
Weissman or OPM. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. McLaughlin was a dean at Fordham Law School and Putzel had taught legal
ethics at Fordham.
35. Id. at 46.
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man but cautioned against pressing the OPM executive too hard. 6
Finally, McLaughlin and Putzel recommended several steps, such as
requiring OPM to certify in writing the legitimacy of each new transaction, in order to avoid further fraud.3 7 Based on the experts' advice, Singer Hutner continued to represent OPM throughout the
summer of 1980.38
The safeguards employed by Singer Hutner did not prevent
OPM from using the firm's services to continue the fraud.3 9 After
June 1980, OPM succeeded in securing an additional seventy million dollars worth of loans with fraudulent leases. 40 Goodman's relationship with Singer Hutner deteriorated rapidly. The firm wanted
Goodman to make a full disclosure of his crimes to Weissman, but
Goodman delayed such a confession.4 t Despite Goodman's disclosure of some details of the fraud in September of 1980 and his assurance that all fraud had ceased, Singer Hutner voted to withdraw
42
from representation of OPM.
Once again following the advice of outside counsel, the firm engaged in a structured withdrawal designed to avoid any prejudice to
36. Id. "One reason [not to push Goodman too hard], as Putzel explained in a deposition, was his concern that the law firm's obligations to OPM might be inconsistent with
giving Goodman's secrets the fullest protection." Id.
37. Id.
38. The Trustee characterized the advice received from Putzel and McLaughlin as
follows: "Although McLaughlin and Putzel in good faith considered their advice appropriate in the circumstances, the Trustee believes it was in fact the worst possible advice
from the point of view of OPM, the third parties with whom it dealt, Singer Hutner's
successor counsel, and Singer Hutner itself." TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 34,
M. STEINBERG at 954.
39. Taylor, supra note 12, at 48. The Trustee found Singer Humer's conduct on the
whole "nothing short of shocking." TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 35, M. STEINBERG at 954. Specifically, the Trustee stated:
Singer Hutner was wrong in relying on Goodman's representations that
the fraud had stopped and ignoring substantial evidence that it had not. Just
after Goodman's confession, Clifton's [OPM's accountant] lawyer had informed
Hutner and another Singer Hutner partner of Clifton's belief that OPM could
not survive without continued wrongdoing. In addition, on two occasions in
June and July, Singer Hutner lawyers noticed peculiarities in title documents
used in fraudulent Rockwell lease financings that should have led them to seek
to confirm their authenticity with third parties.
Id. at 33-34, M. STEINBERG at 953.
40. Id. at 34, M. STEINBERG at 953.
41. Goodman displayed a dramatic flair in his attempts to delay a full confession of
his wrongdoing. After Singer Hutner had given Goodman a deadline for confessing to
Weissman, Goodman threatened to hurl himself through the window of his office. Taylor, supra note 12, at 48.
42. In fact, Goodman did not make a full disclosure: he did admit to a multi-million
dollar fraud but denied it had continued beyond June 1980. TRUSTEE'S REPORT, Supra
note 11, at 34, M. STEINBERG at 953.
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OPM. 43 If anyone inquired as to the reason for the withdrawal,
Singer Hutner stated simply that both parties had agreed to part
ways.4 4 This misleading explanation of withdrawal allowed OPM to
hire a different law firm and to obtain more than fifteen million dollars in additional loans based on fraudulent leases. 45 The end came
for OPM in March 1981 when the company filed a voluntary petition
for reorganization.4 6 An investigation resulted in Goodman and
Weissman pleading guilty to charges related to the fraud.4 7 Singer
Hutner did not escape OPM's collapse and was named as a codefendant in a series of multi-million dollar lawsuits.48
The OPM situation demonstrates the conflicts that may arise
among the various duties of a law firm when faced with client fraud.
As OPM's counsel, the firm owed OPM a duty of zealous representation.4 9 Singer Hutner also represented the individual interests of
both Goodman and Weissman.5 ° The firm could only conceal the
wrongdoing of its client Goodman at the expense of keeping Weissman ignorant of information directly affecting his interests. The duties of a law firm do not end with the duty to clients but also include
duties owed to others. 5 Many banks and lending institutions relied
on Singer Hutner's opinion letters to lend OPM huge sums of cash.
The firm owed these lending institutions a duty of assuring the accuracy of its opinion letters.52 Beyond these duties, Singer Hutner
had conflicting concerns about its own self-interest. The firm
wanted to respond to OPM's fraud in a legal and ethical manner but
did not wish to lose a client essential to its financial survival. The
outcome of the OPM case indicates the difficulty a law firm and its
attorneys confront in serving all of these conflicting interests. Based
on the information Singer Hutner received from its outside counsel,
the firm placed primary emphasis on its duties to its clients. As a

43. Taylor, supra note 12, at 48-49.
44. Id. at 49. At one point Putzel advised a Singer Hutner partner that the partner
should not warn even a close personal friend about OPM's true status. Id.

45. Id.
46. See TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 26, M. STEINBERG at 948.
47. Id.
48. Taylor, supra note 12, at 52.
49. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
50. Representation of those conflicting interests was prohibited by MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-19 (1980).
51. See id. at EC 7-19 to -39 (discussing an attorney's obligations toward the adversary system).
52. See id. at DR 1-102 (4) (lawyer should not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
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result, banks and lending institutions suffered, the firm itself suffered, and OPM never rectified the consequences of the fraud.
In addition to the duties mentioned above, Singer Hutner had a
general duty to maintain the legal profession's integrity and competence. 53 On the surface it would appear that Singer Hutner
breached this duty. The firm's conduct assisted OPM in concealing
its fraud far beyond the point when Singer Hutner could have ended
it.5 4 Due in part to the firm's neutral notice of withdrawal, a second
law firm unwittingly became an instrument for securing additional
fraudulent loans. However, one might ask: did Singer Hutner fail
in its duty to the legal profession or did the legal profession fail in
its duty to Singer Hutner? The firm received "expert" legal advice
on its legal and ethical duties. According to Putzel, "the advice we
gave was correct based on what we knew at the time." 5 5 Given the
final results of the OPM case, the need to rethink those principles
contained in McLaughlin and Putzel's advice is obvious.
III.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF CLIENT FRAUD

In the OPM case, Singer Hutner believed that the risk of financial harm to others did not justify a revocation of its client's privilege of confidentiality. Singer Hutner's belief demonstrates that
one of the basic disagreements over the proper scope of the attorney-client privilege concerns where one draws the line between the
56
privilege and those interests significant enough to overcome it.
Virtually no one disputes the attorney's right to disclose a client
confidence when necessary to prevent an imminent threat to human
life.5 7 Substantial debate, however, surrounds the attorney's ability
to disclose a confidence when necessary to protect a third party's
property interest. Commentators on attorney-client confidentiality
generally fall into one of two categories. The first category supports
a broad application of the privilege and emphasizes the duty an attorney justifiably owes to the client. Commentators in the second
category stress the attorney's role in society and the occasional need
to place society's interests before the client's right to confidentiality.

53. Id. at Canon 1.
54. See TRUSTEE'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 33, M. STEINBERG at 953.
55. Taylor, supra note 12, at 52.
56. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1091.
57. See, e.g., Freedman.... Wrong? Silence isRight, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1983, § 1, at
17, col. 1.
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Arguments Against Disclosure

Two arguments, one legal and one factual, support the views of
commentators who maintain that the attorney's duty to the client
restricts the attorney's authority to disclose client confidences. Invoking the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights, the "legal argument" against greater disclosure of client confidences starts from
the premise that the sixth amendment right to counsel requires a
strong attorney-client privilege. Under the sixth amendment, a
criminally accused individual has the right to have an attorney defend the accused's life, liberty, and property. In today's complex
and legalistic society, the government can easily threaten an individual's legally protected interests without the formality of a criminal
prosecution. 5 a Consider the hypothetical case of a merchant who
operates a small and marginally profitable grocery store in an impoverished area. The government unwisely enacts new and potentially unenforceable food stamp regulations that the merchant must
violate to remain solvent. Like the criminally accused, the merchant
needs the services of an attorney to protect the merchant's liberty
and livelihood from the effects of the new regulations. 59 A rule requiring disclosure of present or future client misconduct, however,
could severely restrict the merchant's ability to obtain the effective
assistance of counsel. If the merchant chose to remain in business,
the rule would require the attorney to inform the government of the
client's violation of the regulations. The attorney's disclosure could
adversely affect the merchant's ability to obtain a fair hearing. 60 If,
on the other hand, the merchant decided to go out of business
rather than violate the regulations, the merchant would have neither
a practical reason nor the financial ability to hire an attorney. In this
manner, the government might deprive an individual of property
and threaten that person's liberty without the individual's being able
to receive the assistance of counsel. 6 This result would violate the
58. See Freeman, Recent GovernmentalAttacks on the PrivateLawyer as an Infringement of the
Constitutional Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 36 Bus. LAw. 1791, 1795 (1981).

59. Cf. Burke, supra note 3, at 257 (asserting that current regulatory environment
often requires a corporation to seek legal advice).
60. See Pickholz, The Proposed Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct and Other Assaults Upon
the Attorney-Client Relationship: Does "Serving the Public Interest" Disserve the Public Interest? 36

Bus. LAw. 1841, 1850 (1981).
61. Even if the food stamp regulations did not impose criminal sanctions, the
merchant would have just cause for concern. See generally Nessen, Rethinking The Lawyer's
Duties to Disclose Information: A Critique of Some ofJudge Frankel's Proposals,24 N.Y.L. ScH. L.

677, 709 (1979) (observing that people become very concerned over threatened
loss of property and acknowledging the threat government bureaucracy can pose against
property).
REV.
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basic concept of the sixth amendment, which should apply "against
all government process of major impact." 6 2
The legal argument also relies on fundamental principles of individual liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights. A restriction of the
attorney-client privilege could result in the individual's forfeiting
certain liberties to advance governmental interests. For example,
suppose a client consults an attorney about a proposed course of
conduct of questionable legality. The attorney believes that the
conduct would violate the law, but the client disagrees with the attorney's analysis. A mandatory disclosure law would force the client
either to abide by the attorney's analysis and refrain from the questionable conduct, or else to risk potential prosecution when the attorney exposes the conduct to the government. Even if the client
were confident of success in any prosecution, the potential costs
might dissuade the client from taking the risk. When the client
yields to the advice, the client's autonomy has been partially surren68
dered to an attorney closely allied with the governmental interest.
One might argue that the grant of this decisionmaking authority
over the client fosters efficient law enforcement and thereby benefits
society as a whole. The legal argument quickly responds that the
Bill of Rights protects individual liberties against government action
and does not guarantee efficient law enforcement.' For this reason, any attempt to restrict the attorney-client privilege would frustrate the Bill of Rights' attempt to place certain individual rights
above the interests of the government.6 5
The "factual argument" against greater disclosure of client
confidences shifts to the practical realities of the attorney-client relationship. First, mandatory or permissive disclosure would hinder
competent legal representation. Competent legal representation re62. Freeman, supra note 58; cf. Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional? 35 U.
L. REV. 685, 687 (1981) (arguing that professional rules of conduct should enable
an attorney to advance the client's rights).
63. See Pickholz, supra note 60 (stating that when lawyer and client differ, a rule requiring disclosure of client misconduct would mean the lawyer should prevail);
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 684
(1978) (arguing that to require lawyers to deny assistance when a client proposes conduct the attorney views as "unconscionable" would impose standards of an elite upon
segments of society not fairly represented at the bar).
64. See Freeman, supra note 58, at 1793; see also Koskoff, supra note 6, at 262 (describing as totalitarian or collective a society that values the interests of the state over the
rights of individuals).
65. See Pickholz, supra note 60, at 1844, 1849 (comparing greater disclosure requirements to the legal system of William the Conqueror who demanded that attorneys owe
primary loyalty to the King).
MIAMI
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quires that the client reveal all relevant information to the attorney.6 6 A rule that would require or allow the attorney to disclose
the client's intended misconduct might cause the client to withhold
potentially incriminating information.6 7 The client may not possess,
however, the requisite skills and knowledge to determine what is incriminating and may erroneously withhold favorable information.68
Failure to reveal all relevant information could cause the attorney to
render incomplete, inadequate, or even incorrect legal advice. 69 It
therefore follows that the attorney-client privilege must remain
broad to assure "that future clients will have enough faith in the
system to confide in their lawyers in the first place." ' 70 A client's
faith in the system creates benefits that go beyond the mere confines
of the attorney-client relationship.
The free flow of information theory asserts that the attorneyclient privilege allows the attorney to perform a beneficial and overlooked role in society. When a client reveals an intention to engage
in illegal activity, the attorney may counsel against such activity and
persuade the client to remain within the law. 71 The client would
probably not reveal an illegal intention to the attorney in the absence of a strong attorney-client privilege. 72 The OPM case illustrates this point by Goodman's refusal to discuss his illegal activity
with Singer Hutner after the firm denied his request for complete
confidentiality.73 Without a full disclosure by Goodman, Singer
Hutner could not effectively counsel against future fraudulent conduct. In this manner, greater disclosure of client confidences would
harm the interests of society by depriving many attorneys of the
ability to counsel their clients against wrongful behavior.
According to the next aspect of the factual argument, greater
disclosure of client misconduct would restrict the vital role attorneys
play in the continuing development of the law. Attorneys assist in
effecting legal change by convincing courts to discard outdated, unrealistic, and unconstitutional laws and regulations. For example,
66. Burke, supra note 3, at 253-54; f. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 4-1 (1980) ("A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer

....11).
67. See Burke, supra note 3, at 253-54.
68. Freedman, supra note 57, at col. 2.
69. Burke, supra note 3, at 253-54.
70. Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's
Code: Surprisingly Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 776 (1981).
71. Id. at 794; see also G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 28 (1978).
72. See Freedman, supra note 57.
73. Singer Hutner refused complete confidentiality not because of a duty to the government but because of duties owed to Weissman and OPM.
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clients occasionally request their attorney's advice about an activity
that the law expressly neither prohibits nor allows.7 4 The attorneys
should respond by carefully analyzing the various values at stake
and by giving an opinion that reflects how the law ought to develop
75
based upon what society would determine to be fair and proper.
If clients accept their attorney's analysis and the government challenges the conduct, the attorney may then have the opportunity to
persuade a court to alter the existing law. Greater disclosure of client misconduct would decrease this function of the attorney because
many clients would not reveal any intention to challenge the present
boundaries of the law. Instead, a client might choose to remain
safely within the law and to leave unchallenged an unjust law. A
client might also engage in the questionable conduct without seeking the advice of an attorney. The client's lack of legal sophistication, however, could result in conduct so clearly illegal as to
preclude a successful challenge to the suspect law. 76 Given the
changing nature and legal complexities of today's world, society
needs the attorney to challenge and question those aspects of the
law that do not reflect present reality. In short, greater disclosure of
client confidences would harm society by decreasing the attorney's
77
role in legal development.
The third and final aspect of the factual argument against
greater disclosure of client confidences raises the question of practicability. Greater disclosure would not work in practice because
neither attorneys nor clients desire a restriction of the attorney-client privilege. The OPM case clearly demonstrates how client
friendship and financial considerations combined to discourage a
law firm from disclosing a client's misconduct. A firm might view
any disclosure of client confidences as a "betrayal of trust, ' 78 affecting not only the firm's conscience but also its relationship with other
74. Burke, supra note 3, at 255; Lorne, The Corporateand Securities Adviser, The Public
Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 425, 467 (1978).

75. Lorne, supra note 74, at 473.
76. Consider, for example, a merchant who owns a gift shop specializing in European products. To take advantage of the Christmas season, the merchant wishes to remain open on Sunday in violation of local Blue Laws. Many other merchants question
the validity of the Blue Laws and have remained open on Sunday without receiving govemnment sanctions. The merchant remains open on Sunday but inadvertantly sells an
expensive bottle of French wine in violation of local liquor laws. If the government
chooses to prosecute the merchant, it can prevent a challenge to its Blue Laws by charging the merchant with the liquor law violation.
77. See Lorne, supra note 74, at 473-74.
78. Burke, supra note 3, at 264; Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 765, 782.
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clients.7 9 Financial considerations might also discourage disclosure
when, as in the case of Singer Hutner, disclosure of a client's misconduct could lead to financial ruin for the law firm. For these reasons, a firm might avoid disclosure by finding or forging a loophole
in the disclosure law or by relying on the client's promise to cease
the wrongful activity and to rectify any consequences. The firm
could also avoid a disclosure requirement by purposely remaining
ignorant of the client's wrongful acts. Clients would undoubtedly
assist their attorneys in eluding the disclosure law by keeping their
misconduct concealed. Under this analysis, a greater disclosure law
would fail to achieve its desired result and should therefore never be
enacted.8"
The various arguments against greater disclosure of client confidences characterize the attorney-client privilege as a misunderstood right. When society criticizes the confidentiality between an
attorney and a client, it fails to understand the beneficial role that
the privilege plays in the legal system and the protection of individual rights. 8 ' Commentators who favor greater disclosure of client
confidences do not deny that the attorney-client privilege achieves
certain benefits. Instead, they argue that greater disclosure of client
misconduct in a nonadversarial setting would not necessarily sacrifice the legitimate interests that the privilege currently serves. Commentators who favor greater disclosure pose several arguments to
support their views. Each of these arguments expands on the belief
that the legal profession can formulate a disclosure standard that
would separate those who use confidentiality for legitimate purposes from the few who abuse the privilege to conceal illegal
activity.
B.

Arguments For Disclosure

In representing a client, an attorney may act as either an advocate in an adversarial proceeding or as an advisor in a nonadversarial setting. Those who favor greater disclosure of client
misconduct distinguish these two roles and conclude that societal
needs justify disclosure in nonadversarial situations. The argument
79. See G. HAZARD, supra note 71, at 31 (suggesting that law firms might view a firm
that discloses client confidences as untrustworthy); cf Lorne, supra note 74, at 481 (suggesting that if a firm has the reputation of concealing clients' misconduct, all clients of
that firm will suffer a tarnished reputation).
80. See authorities cited supra note 2.
81. See Koskoff, supra note 6 (asserting that attorneys best serve public interest by
serving individuals).
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begins with the premise that the very nature of the adversary system
establishes the boundaries for attorney behavior. The system assigns neither moral nor legal responsibility for the results the attorney achieves.8 2 For example, the system will not condemn an
attorney who successfully defends an unpopular and obviously
guilty civil defendant by pleading the statute of limitations. Those
attorneys who assume the role of advocate usually attempt to defend
or enforce their client's interests based on past and completed
events. The adversary system allows the attorney to pursue these
interests in a forum in which the "essential elements are an impartial tribunal of defined jurisdiction, formal rules of procedure and
governing substantive law, and assignment to the parties of the task
of presenting their own best cases and of challenging the presentations of their opponents."8 " In addition, certain rules exist to govern the permissible scope of the advocates' behavior. An advocate
cannot, for example, present false evidence or allow a client to commit perjury.8 4 Many presume that if the advocate obeys the rules of
the adversary system, " 'truth' will emerge from a clash of opposing
views." ' 85 The system, rather than the advocate, assumes the responsibility for all matters decided in accordance with the rules
provided.
The advisory role of the attorney differs greatly from that of the
advocate. The adversary system cannot relieve the advisor of moral
and legal responsibility for the advisor's actions. Instead of pursuing
the client's interests in court, the legal advisor provides the "client
with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications."' 86 This advice
often takes place between the attorney and the client without the
presence of an impartial tribunal, other parties, and rules specifically designed to limit the scope of the advisor's role.8 7 Unlike the
advocate, the advisor looks to the future by assisting the client in
charting a prospective course of conduct.8 8 One can easily argue
that the advisor who influences a client's future conduct must bear
some of the responsibility if that client engages in illegal activity.
Because the advisor cannot rely on the adversary system for relief
82.
83.
84.
Nix v.

Schwartz, supra note 63, at 671.
Id. at 672.
See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1981);

Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).

85. Flynn, ProfessionalEthics and the Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 429, 431.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
87. See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 677-78.
88. See id. at 693.
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from this responsibility, the advisor must "find a social need for the
technical assistance of nonadvocates that would take priority over
moral considerations. '"89 Unfortunately for the advisor implicated
in a client's wrongdoing, society does not appear willing to justify
this need.
The first argument in favor of greater disclosure of client misconduct concludes that the reliance society must place on the advice
a nonadvocate renders to a client justifies disclosure of client misconduct in many nonadversarial settings. 90 For example, when the
advisor assists a client in the preparation of a registration statement
for an upcoming public offering of stock, both the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the investing public rely on the
trustworthiness of that statement. Similarly, inadequate staffing of
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires the Treasury Department to rely on the attorney who aids a client in completing a technical and complex tax return. If attorneys knowingly concealed
clients' intentions to commit securities fraud or to cheat on their
taxes, then the integrity and efficiency of these institutions would
suffer. Society has enacted laws to prohibit individuals from abusing
these and other institutions and no justification exists to allow confidentiality to "become a sword by which a client accomplishes
through a lawyer what the law would forbid the client himself."'"
The legal profession should restrict the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality in nonlitigation settings in which society must rely on
the advisor's good faith.92
Certain problems do exist in any attempt to separate an attorney's role as an advocate from the role of advisor. Frequently, the
attorney serves a client in both roles.9 3 The example of the attorney
who assists a client in the preparation of a registration statement
illustrates one possible dilemma of this dual role.9 4 Suppose the attorney uncovers a fact that the law requires the statement to disclose, but disclosure of this fact would adversely affect the client's
89. Id.
90. See Patterson, The Limits of the Lawyer's Discretion and the Law of Legal Ethics: Na-

tional Student Marketing Revisited, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1270. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 63,
at 678 (comparing the attorney's role as advisor to two teams playing a pick-up nonrefereed basketball game).
91. Taylor, supra note 2 (quoting Robert Kutak).
92. See generally Patterson, supra note 90, at 1270 (suggesting that the proper scope
for attorney conduct should depend on the attorney's significance in the process
involved).
93. Some even suggest that society has chosen attorneys to advise businesses because of the adversarial talents attorneys possess. See Lome, supra note 74, at 434.
94. Id. at 465.
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position in an ongoing litigation.9" Should the attorney view his or
her primary responsibility as preventing the client from issuing an
incomplete registration statement or as preserving the client's interest in the litigation? While some commentators insist that this type
of dilemma does not occur often, it does occur. 96 Therefore, any
attempt to separate the attorney as advocate from the attorney as
advisor must address this situation.
A second major argument in favor of greater disclosure of client misconduct raises a more philosophical consideration of the attorney's moral integrity. When a client uses an attorney to achieve
an illegal or unjust objective, the client not only harms the interests
of society but also may cause the attorney to experience a sense of
moral guilt.9 7 If the attorney could have prevented the unjust result, the sense of guilt may intensify.9 8 At least one Singer Hutner
partner experienced a deep sense of moral guilt when Putzel advised the firm that it could not warn other attorneys away from representing OPM.9 9 One might argue that attorneys could rightfully
escape this guilt by viewing themselves as the amoral agents of the
client. Amorality may imply either that the attorney has chosen not
to judge the client's behavior or that the attorney does not possess a
proper standard to judge the client.'°° In either case, the amorality
argument fails because it refuses to grant the attorney status as a
moral individual. A decision not to judge a client's conduct represents a decision that the client's interests outweigh competing interests of society.'
Furthermore, the attorney's training and
profession provide a ready standard to judge the legality of a client's
behavior.' 0 2 In this sense, amoral conduct quickly becomes apathetic or immoral conduct and signifies the need for a rule allowing
attorneys to disclose a client's misdeed.
Even those who argue persuasively for greater disclosure of client misconduct recognize the apparent conflict between the attor95. Id.
96. Patterson, supra note 90, at 1269-70.
97. Gillers, Lawyers'Silence: Wrong .... N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1983, § 1, at 17, col. 2;
see also Burke, supra note 3, at 243 (quoting Bentham's condemnation of the attorneyclient privilege as a protection of the guilty).
98. Gillers, supra note 97.
99. See Taylor, supra note 12, at 49.
100. Flynn, supra note 85, at 429-30.
101. Cf. Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers From Their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer's
Role, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 32-34 (1980) (suggesting that attorneys become so identified
with the clients' interests that they adopt the clients' beliefs as their own).
102. See Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client, in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 672 (1981).
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ney's ability to disclose and the duty of loyalty to the client.
Professor L. Ray Patterson, consultant to the ABA commission that
drafted the Model Rules, has developed a theory that reconciles the
two concepts. 0 3 Although the limits of this comment do not permit
a full discussion of the theory, the basic premise is worthy of note.
Professor Patterson views the attorney-client relationship as
one of reciprocal rather than simple agency. 10 4 Both attorney and
client derive their rights and duties in the relationship from the positive law and from the other's rights and duties.'0 5 Decisionmaking
authority in the relationship depends on the interrelationship of the
rights and duties of the attorney with those of the client.' 0 6 In view
of this relationship, the attorney acting as the client's representative
may disclose a confidential communication when the client fails to
perform a duty owed to others.
Thus, when the client attempts to accomplish an illegal objective, the attorney may implement the client's duty to remain within
the law.' 0 7 Implementation of the client's duty may require the attorney to disclose a confidential communication if the client has a
corresponding duty to disclose the information. 0 8 One could argue
that this conclusion violates the duty of loyalty between the attorney
and the client, but Patterson believes "the lawyer's implementation
of the client's duty for the client cannot be correctly characterized as
an act of disloyalty."' 0 9 In this manner, attorneys may disclose a
client's fraudulent intent without sacrificing the duty of loyalty that
attorneys owe to their clients.
103. Patterson, The Function of a Code of Legal Ethics, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 695 (1981)
[hereinafter Patterson, Function]. See also Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of
Loyalty, 29 EMORY L. J. 909, 960-69 (1980) (characterizing confidentiality as a "corresponding right" of the lawyer, one that is dependent on the client's own legal rights and
duties; when client expresses an intention to act illegally, lawyer has authority and responsibility to disclose).
104. Patterson, Function, supra note 103, at 704-08.
105. Id. at 708-14.
106. Id. at 708.
107. Id. at 721. Although Patterson used the duty of candor to the tribunal as an
instance in which the attorney assumes the duty of the client, he admitted that the client's duty of fairness to others follows a similar analysis. Id. at 722.
108. Id. at 720. In this manner, Patterson has placed confidentiality as a right that the
client derives directly from the positive law. Since confidentiality involves the attorney's
acting on the client's behalf in the presence of other parties, the attorney must derive
the duty of confidentiality directly from the client. This analysis conflicts with a view of
confidentiality as a right and duty existing solely between the attorney and the client.
Patterson believes that the presence of other parties does not allow confidentiality to be
analyzed as simply existing between the attorney and the client. Id.
109. Id. at 721.
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COMMON-LAW AND ETHICAL CODE RESPONSES
TO THE CLIENT-FRAUD DILEMMA

Although the arguments both for and against greater disclosure
may contain persuasive reasons to either prohibit or allow disclosure of confidential communications, the thoughts of legal scholars
do not necessarily control the actual practice of law. When attorneys confront situations of client misconduct, they may find their
options governed by either common law principles or a professional
ethical code. The common law and most ethical codes have provisions relating to the attorney-client privilege, but none has developed an effective solution to the client-fraud dilemma.
Common law principles cannot fully resolve the client-fraud dilemma because, in a strict sense, the common law views the attorney-client privilege in a litigation context." ° Confidentiality exists
under commom law as an evidentiary privilege that forbids a tribunal from compelling an attorney to reveal confidential communications. The common law does attempt, however, to define the limits
of the privilege, and this definition offers some insight for the purposes of this comment. Most courts do not consider the evidentiary
privilege as absolute"' and have refused to apply it in certain situations. One court explained:
Because the attorney-client privilege is not to be used as a
cloak for illegal or fraudulent behavior, it is well established that the privilege does not apply where legal representation was secured in furtherance of intended, or
present, continuing illegality. The crime or fraud exception applies even where the attorney is completely unaware
that his advice is sought in furtherance of such an improper
purpose. "12
In this manner, the common law refuses to grant the evidentiary
privilege to a client who has used the attorney to accomplish an illegal act. By characterizing confidentiality as an evidentiary privilege,
the commom law places no duty upon an attorney to disclose client
misconduct unless disclosure is requested by a court or other tribu110. See G. HAZARD, supra note 71, at 22 ("The attorney-client privilege strictly speaking has application only in a forensic setting, that is, in a trial or something like it such as
a legislative investigation.").
11. See 8 J. WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 2298, at 572 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961);
Burke, supra note 3, at 244.
112. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations
omitted).
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nal.1"3 Because many situations of client-fraud do not involve a
court or tribunal, an attorney must look beyond the common law for
guidance.
The ABA has attempted to resolve the client-fraud dilemma in
its codes of ethical and professional conduct. 14 These standards go
beyond the common law and contain provisions that address the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality outside the judicial context.
Unfortunately, the ABA's insistence on placing the duty of loyalty to
the client before the duty of fairness to others has prevented the
ethical codes from providing an effective solution to the client-fraud
dilemma.
In 1908, the ABA first adopted the Canons of Legal Ethics (Canons)
as a "general guide" to the practice of law."' The Canons contained two provisions relevant to the client-fraud dilemma, but an
apparent contradiction between these provisions precluded a coherent policy on the disclosure of client misconduct."' Canon 41 required that:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has
been practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court
or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the
injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps."'
While Canon 41 appeared to place a duty upon an attorney to
disclose client misconduct in certain situations, Canon 37 stated
quite clearly: "It is the duty of the lawyer to protect client confidences."' " 8 Formal Opinion 287 resolved this conflict in 1953 by
113. G. HAZARD, supra note 71, at 25.
114. The ABA's codes do not, in and of themselves, have any binding legal effect.
However, the court systems of many states adopt the current ABA code as the law of that
jurisdiction.
115. CANONS OF LEGAL ETHICS Preamble (1957). The Canons were based largely
upon the ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS (1887). Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Why Do We Need Them?, 36 OKLA L. REV. 311, 312 (1983). The Alabama Code of Ethics
was based largely upon the works of two earlier codes. See generally Patterson, Legal Ethics
and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 912-13 (1980) (discussing the earlier
codes of ethics and how they perceived the attorney's duty of loyalty.).
116. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953)
(attorney learns that his client committed perjury to secure a divorce and the ex-wife
threatens to reveal the perjury if the client does not pay support) [hereinafter Opinion
287]; Burke, supra note 3, at 247 & n.30.
117. CANONS OF LEGAL ETHICS Canon 41 (1908), quoted in Opinion 287, supra note
116.
118. CANONS OF LEGAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1908), quoted in Burke, supra note 3, at 247.
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concluding that Canon 37 overrode Canon 41 and protected all
communications that fell within the common law evidentiary privilege."19 In addition, the drafters of Opinion 287 stated their belief
that Canon 41 applied only when a client used fraud or deception to
20
gain an unfair advantage over another party in a civil litigation.'
By resolving the conflict between Canon 41 and Canon 37 in favor
of the duty to preserve client confidences, Opinion 287 established
a precedent that all subsequently-adopted ABA codes have
followed.
The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility (Model Code) replaced
the Canons in 1969 but failed to establish a conclusive policy regarding the client-fraud dilemma. As originally enacted, the Model Code's
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-102(B) required the attorney to disclose a
client's fraudulent behavior if the client refused the attorney's advice to rectify the consequences of the fraud. 12 1 Although DR 7102(B) closely resembled Canon 41, the new rule did not appear
limited to fraud in civil litigations.1 22 In a 1974 amendment to DR
7-102(B), however, the ABA exempted from disclosure any information that qualified as a privileged communication. i23 Formal Opinion 341 subsequently defined privileged communications as those
confidences and secrets protected by DR 4 - 1 0 1 .124 Unfortunately, a
careful reading of the relevant Model Code provisions in light of
119. Opinion 287, supra note 116. The Committee noted that Canon 37 was consistent with the attorney-client privilege as it existed at common law. Lawyers could not
reveal client disclosures, except when necessary to prevent a future crime. The client
here had already committed the perjury, a past crime. Therefore, the fraud fell within
the evidentiary privilege and was protected by Canon 37. The Committee further explained that the attorney had a duty to advise the client to rectify the fraud; if the client
failed to do so, the attorney had to withdraw from representation.
120. Applied to the OPM situation, Canon 41 would not have required Singer Hutner
to disclose its client's misconduct despite the fact that OPM was using fraud to take an
unfair advantage over other parties. The fraud did not occur in the context of a civil
lawsuit. This interpretation of Canon 41 was affirmed in ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 778 (1968).
121. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) stated:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to
the affected person or tribunal.
122. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) substituted the word "person" where Canon 41
had used the term "party." This change was especially significant because it was enacted
after Opinion 287.
123. The 1974 Amendment simply added the words "except when the information is
protected as a privileged communication" to the end of DR 7-102(B)(1).
124. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
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Opinion 341 resulted in a circular analysis. While DR 7-102(B) required the disclosure of information not protected by DR 4-101, DR
4-101 allowed the disclosure of privileged communications when required by another Disciplinary Rule (such as DR 7-102(B)). Most
commentators interpreted Opinion 341 as favoring confidentiality
over disclosure and permitting disclosure only in extremely rare and
perhaps nonexistent situations.' 25 The Model Code thus served to
advance the duty of preserving a client's confidences at the expense
of those injured by the client's fraud.
The ABA expressly rejected greater disclosure of client misconduct when it voted in 1983 to adopt the Model Rules. 1 26 Since the
1982 revised final draft of the Model Rules contained several provisions designed to permit greater disclosure of client confidences,
debate of the Model Rules forced the ABA to consider the clientfraud dilemma. Model Rule 1.6 (b) of the discussion draft provided:
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a
criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm,
or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's
criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the
lawyer's services had been used;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil
claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved; or
27
(4) to comply with other law.'
125. E.g., Note, supra note 2, at 98-99.
126. Prompted in part by the negative publicity that the legal profession received following Watergate and other scandals, the ABA in 1977 appointed the Commission on
Evaluations of Professional Standards (Commission) headed by Robert Kutak. The
Commission soon concluded that problems within the legal profession required more
than merely amending the Model Code. In January of 1980, the Commission released a
discussion draft of the Model Rules and designated a period for receiving comments and
opinions. Following this period, the Commission released several proposed and revised
final drafts of the Model Rules in 1981 and 1982. The ABA House of Delegates debated
and amended the rules in February 1983, and in August 1983 the ABA officially adopted
the Model Rules. See Elliot, supra note 6, at 269; Kutak, supra note 115, at 314-15; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT 1982-83, at 13, reprintedin 70 A.B.A.J.,Jan. 1984,
at 67-90.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Revised Final Draft 1982).
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Although this rule would not have required the disclosure of clientfraud, it would have permitted attorneys to disclose clients' misconduct under several circumstances. For example, under such a rule
Singer Hutner could have disclosed OPM's fraudulent behavior to
banks, lending institutions, government enforcement agencies, and
any law firm that requested information as to why Singer Hutner
1 28
withdrew as OPM's counsel.
Nevertheless, the ABA adopted a rule that rejected several of
the disclosure provisions contained in the revised final draft.' 29 The
adopted rule reversed the principal impact of the proposed rule by
severely restricting the attorney's ability to disclose confidential
communications. Under the adopted rule an attorney may disclose
a client's confidences only when disclosure is necessary to protect
human life or to protect the attorney from criminal and civil charges
relating to representation of the client.' 3 ° Dean Redlich of the New
York University Law School assessed the ABA's vote on the Model
Rules by stating: " 'The practice of law, if done by sensitive people,
creates financial risks and moral dilemmas.... These votes reflect a
strong desire to eliminate those moral dilemmas by self-imposed
rules that narrow or eliminate the choices a lawyer has.' "'t3'

The

vote also reflects the ABA's persistent view that loyalty to the client
remains a primary duty of the attorney.
The adopted version of Model Rule 1.6 contains what many see
1 32
as a possible alternative to the actual disclosure of client fraud.
128. Singer Hutner could disclose OPM's conduct to the banks and lending institutions for two reasons. First, under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), OPM's continuing conduct was
likely to result in severe financial damage to those parties who lent OPM money based
on fraudulent leases. Second, Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) allowed disclosure since Singer
Hutner's services had been used throughout the fraud. Singer Hutner could disclose
OPM's conduct to government agencies and other law firms in an attempt to prevent
OPM from continuing the fraud.
129. The adopted Model Rule 1.6 (b) provides:
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
130. See G. HAZARD, supra note 71, at 32 (questioning the logic that allows the attorney
to protect only the attorney's own interests).
131. Taylor, Lawyer Confidentiality v. Disclosing Crimes-to-Be, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1983,

§ 1, at 9, col. 1.
132. See Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawaland the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
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Under the Model Rules, an attorney may terminate representation lof
a client if the client engages in criminal or fraudulent behavior. 33
The Official Comment to Model Rule 1.6 implies that the attorney
who withdraws may give "notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the
lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like."' 3 4 Although the attorney may not state the reasons for the withdrawal, mere notice to the affected parties should
35
communicate a satisfactory warning of potential problems.
The ambiguous nature of this notice precludes withdrawal from
serving as an effective alternative to actual disclosure of client misconduct. Consider, for example, a large law firm that ignores a potential conflict of interest and represents both a corporation and the
state-created agency that regulates the business of that corporation.' 3 6 The law firm's discovery that the corporation has engaged
in a multi-million dollar fraud prompts the firm to withdraw with
notice to the affected parties. Many informed observers would view
the withdrawal merely as a recognition of a conflict of interest. Con37
sequently, the corporation would easily secure substitute counsel.
If withdrawal must serve as the primary method of controlling
client fraud, it also poses a potential danger to clients' legitimate
interests. 13 Client-fraud and withdrawal may become so closely
linked that withdrawal presumes client misconduct. Suppose a law
firm decides to withdraw from the representation of a client based
on interpersonal conflicts that preclude the creation of a professional relationship. The client may have difficulty in obtaining new
counsel if other law firms interpret the withdrawal as a condemnation of the client's activities.' 3 9 For these reasons, an ambiguous
notice of withdrawal does not provide an effective alternative to acBlowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455, 471-81 (1984) (asserting
that final draft reflects a compromise between the Kutak Commission, which sought disclosure of client fraud, and amendments passed at the February 1983 meeting prohibiting disclosure).
133. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983).
134. Id. at Rule 1.6 comment 16. Comment 16 would have allowed Singer Hutner to
disaffirm many of the loan documents it executed on behalf of OPM. The ambiguous
nature of the notice of withdrawal, however, could create more problems than it solves.
135. See Rotunda, supra note 132, at 480-81.
136. See, e.g., Marcus, S & L Crisis Hurts Image of Prominent Maryland Law Firm, Wash.
Post, Jan. 21, 1986, § 1, at 8, col. 1.
137. See Gillers, supra note 97. "Lawyers are forbidden to warn their successors. In
this way, each lawyer stays pure while the profession as a whole may become the unintentional silent partner in the crimes and frauds of others." Id.
138. Rotunda, supra note 132, at 481-83.
139. See id. at 480-81. If a law firm's withdrawal from the representation of a client
serves to cast suspicion upon the client, the firm may find itself unable to withdraw.
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tual disclosure of client misconduct. Therefore, Model Rule 1.6
fails to resolve the client-fraud dilemma.
V.

OTHER INFLUENCES

While the Model Rules represent the ABA's opinion of an attorney's ethical reponsibilities, they do not serve as the sole standard
for judging an attorney's conduct. Each state remains free to draft a
different code of professional ethics or to adopt its own version of
the Model Rules. In addition, lawmaking bodies and government
agencies may attempt to regulate certain aspects of the attorney's
conduct in response to a perceived governmental or societal need.
Disagreement among these forces and the ABA over treatment of
the client-fraud dilemma can produce adverse effects for the legal
profession.
Disagreement within the legal profession over Model Rule 1.6
has the potential to diminish the ABA's influence in general. According to Robert Kutak, the Chairman of the Commission that
drafted the Model Rules, "[t]he test for evaluating a national model
must be whether, given inevitable local adaptation, the document
taken as a whole reflects what should and will be acceptable as the
prevailing view in the vast majority of jurisdictions."' 4 ° Currently,
seventeen states, including Maryland, have adopted some version of
the Model Rules; 4 ' three states have rejected the Model Rules in
toto.' 4 2 Of those states adopting the Rules, only three have adopted
Model Rule 1.6 without significant amendment. 4 ' If this pattern
Model Rule 1.16 restricts a law firm's option to withdraw to situations in which withdrawal can be accomplished without harming the interests of the client.
140. Kutak, supra note 115, at 314-15.
141. 2 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) at 142 (Apr. 30, 1986), 245 (July 9,
1986), 261 (July 23, 1986), 401 (Oct. 29, 1986), 494 (Jan. 7, 1987).
142. Id. at 855 (July 10, 1985), 1047 (Nov. 13, 1985). The states are New York, Oregon, and Vermont. Oregon subsequently amended its existing code. The amendment
allows a lawyer to disclose if the lawyer knows that the client intends to commit a crime.
Id. at 245 (July 9, 1986).
143. Delaware, Missouri, and Montana have adopted Model Rule 1.6 without change.
See DEL. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1985); Mo. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1986); MoNT. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1986). Several states have retained a rule
substantially equivalent to Model Code DR 4-101(C)(3), i.e., permissible disclosure to prevent a client from committing a crime. See ARK. MODEL R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1986); IDAHO R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1986); IND. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1986); MINN. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Supp. 1987); N.C. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 (1985 & Supp. 1986); WASH. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1986). Five states
have adopted some degree of mandatory disclosure. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. Sup. Ct.
Rules, Rule 42, ER 1.6 (1986); CONN. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1986); FLA. R. OF
PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1986); NEv. SUP. CT. RULES, R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 156
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continues as other states consider adoption of the Model Rules, the
Rules will clearly fail to achieve a national consensus on the proper
scope of the attorney-client privilege. Given the vital role that the
privilege performs in the practice of law, this failure to achieve a
national consensus would affect the legal profession in two significant and related ways. First, a disagreement between the ABA and
local bar associations over Model Rule 1.6 would detract from the
credibility of the ABA's claim to speak as "the voice of the legal
profession."' 4 4 Second, the loss of the ABA's unified voice might
encourage courts, legislative bodies, and government agencies to
experiment with alternative treatments of the client-fraud
dilemma. 145
In the mid-1970s the SEC did attempt to establish an alternative approach to the client-fraud dilemma. In SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp. 146 the SEC brought suit against a law firm for aiding
and abetting a client in securities law violations in connection with a
merger. Significantly, the SEC condemned the law firm not for actually participating in the wrongdoing, but rather for failing to take
action necessary to prevent a client's misconduct. 4 7 The SEC's po(1986); NJ. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1987). Three states have adopted rules
allowing disclosure in a broader range of circumstances than those indicated in Model
Rule 1.6. See MD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Supp. Aug. 1986); N.H. R. OF PROF.
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1986); N.M. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6
144. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT 1980-81, at

(1986).
2, reprintedin 67 A.B.A.

J. 1479-1502 (1981).
145. Taylor, supra note 2, at col. 4. A disagreement between the ABA and local bar
associations could
make the ethical rules less useful as the practice of law turns increasingly to
complex multistate transactions, and would leave a vacuum likely to be filled by
courts, prosecutors and government agencies. They would increasingly be
tempted to make up for the deficiencies of professional self-regulation by imposing civil and criminal liability on lawyers under laws such as those regulating
securities.
Id.
146. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). Counsel for the National Student Marketing
Corporation discovered shortly before the closing of a merger that the corporation had
distributed misleading financial statements to its shareholders. Despite the discovery,
counsel did nothing to stop the transaction. Id.at 691-97.
147. The SEC's complaint alleged that the corporation's attorneys "failed to insist
that ...

shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to ... notify the plaintiff Commis-

sion concerning the misleading nature of the nine month financial statements." Lorne,
supra note 74, at 455 (quoting 48(1) of the SEC complaint). The court agreed that the
attorneys had a duty to delay the closing pending resolicitation of the shareholders. 457
F. Supp. at 714. Finding the further question of a duty to disclose outside the scope of
the case before it, the court did not reach a decision on the SEC's claim that such a duty
existed. Id. at 714-15. Professor Patterson saw the effects of the SEC's complaint and
the court's opinion in National Student Marketing as threefold. First, the duty of loyalty to
the client no longer existed as the primary criterion for an attorney's ethical decision-
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sition represented an attempt to alter the attorney's duty of loyalty
to the client by creating a co-equal or superior duty of candor to
others."' s The SEC viewed attorneys and their special skills as "access points" to the securities market."4 9 If attorneys possessed an
affirmative duty to investigate their clients for possible violations of
the law, the attorneys would in effect deny those engaged in wrongdoing access to the securities market.' 0 Under this analysis, attorneys would become enforcement agents of the SEC 15 with an
affirmative duty of candor to the SEC and others. Such a duty would
clearly conflict with the Model Code's duty of loyalty to the client.
The legal profession resisted the SEC's attempt to alter the attorney-client relationship. In addition, commentators condemned the
SEC for not fully comprehending the effects of its actions on the
legitimate rights of clients.152
Although the SEC has since retreated from its aggressive position put forward in National Student Marketing, the case temporarily
had an adverse impact on the securities bar. Any action brought by
the SEC against a law firm automatically created negative publicity
for the firm' 5 3 and occasionally served as a catalyst for charges of
civil and criminal contempt.' 5 4 These consequences, combined with
the prospect of a lengthy and expensive court battle, forced many
making. Second, the lawyer's standard of conduct now resided in the positive law as
opposed to abstract theory. Finally, the attorney had to henceforth analyze the attorney's own legal problems in the same manner in which the attorney analyzed the client's
legal problems (i.e., by reference to the positive law). Patterson, supra note 90, at 127374.
148. 457 F. Supp. at 1254; see generally Block, An Overview: Responsibilities of Attorneys
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 36 Bus. LAw. 1781, 1784-85 (1981) (noting SEC's position that counsel aware of potential fraudulent transactions should inform the board of
directors when management requires counsel's advice concerning disclosure and, failing
any remedial action of the board, resign and/or inform shareholders and the SEC of the
nondisclosure).
149. Pickholz, supra note 60, at 1848.
150. Cf id. (presenting theory that securities lawyers would be pressured to advise
their clients in accordance with the government's viewpoint); Freeman, supra note 58, at
1792 (observing that the attorney's obligation to disclose to some outside group, if not
to the government, would effectively result in the SEC's receiving notice of the
disclosure).
151. Pickholz, supra note 60, at 1848.
152. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 58, at 1793; Lome, supra note 74, at 455; Pickholz,
supra, note 60, at 1842.
153. See Block, supra note 148, at 1782. The negative publicity generated by an SEC
prosecution was generally aggravated by the SEC's tendency to overstate its claim.
Lorne, supra note 74, at 457.
154. Lorne, supra note 74, at 457. The SEC's complaint could also encourage private
damage suits. Id.
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defendant law firms to seek a negotiated settlement with the SEC.' 5 5
These settlements often produced results that "evidence[d] little
consideration of the lawyer's general role and social obligations."' 5 6
Law firms anxious to avoid an SEC prosecution began to err by placing too much emphasis on their duty of candor to the government.' 57 The SEC's position intimidated attorneys, curtailed
zealous representation of clients, and interfered with the continuing
development of the securities laws. 1 58 These results indicate how a
government agency's attempts to solve the client-fraud dilemma can
challenge the ability of the legal profession to regulate certain aspects of the practice of law.
Model Rule 1.6 and its treatment of the client-fraud dilemma
could encourage actions similar to National Student Marketing which
threaten the legal profession's autonomy. In addition to serving as
a standard for judging an attorney's conduct, the ABA's ethical
codes attempt to safeguard the legal profession's ability to regulate
the practice of law. The Preamble to the Model Rules states:
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although
other professions also have been granted powers of selfgovernment, the legal profession is unique in this respect
because of the close relationship betwen the profession
and the processes of government and law enforcement.
This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the
courts.
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the
legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important
force in preserving government under law, for abuse of
legal authority is more easily challenged by a profession
whose members are not dependent on government for the
155. Id. at 454. The negotiated settlement occasionally required the law firm to implement internal procedures, designed by the SEC, to prevent future wrongdoing. For a

discussion of some of these internal procedures, see id. at 458-64.
156. Id. at 457.
157. In Meyerhofer v. Empire Tire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974),
an attorney disclosed confidential communications that a court eventually held the attorney-client privilege protected. Professor Lorne suggests that the attorney's erroneous
disclosure in Meyerhofer was prompted by the ambiguous Model Code, the National Student
Marketing complaint, and the attorney's concern over his own potential liability. Lorne,

supra note 74, at 456-57.
158. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 21-25 (1975).
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right to practice.' 5 9
Society grants this autonomy to the legal profession, perhaps upon
a belief that the profession will hold its members to a higher standard of conduct than the government would impose. 160 If courts,
legislatures, and government agencies do not consider Model Rule
1.6 a high standard of conduct, they may challenge the profession's
ability to regulate the attorney-client privilege. 16 For example,
Senator Arlen Specter reacted to the passage of the Model Rules by
introducing a bill that would have made an attorney criminally liable
16 2
for a failure to disclose a client's fraudulent or illegal conduct.
The bill did not become law, but it did indicate Specter's view that
the government should act to limit the ABA's influence over the attorney-client privilege. Actions to limit the legal profession's autonomy underscore the need for the ABA to remain sensitive to
opposing views on the client-fraud dilemma.
The ABA should re-examine its current position on the clientfraud dilemma to preserve the legal profession's ability to regulate
the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality. The aftermath of National Student Marketing demonstrates the adverse consequences on
the practice of law resulting from a government agency's attempt to
solve the client-fraud dilemma. Similarly, Senator Specter's bill
threatened to impose criminal sanctions on attorneys who do not
disclose clients' misconduct. The ABA has an interest in avoiding
these consequences but cannot prohibit legislatures and government agencies from regulating the attorney-client privilege. 6 3 Instead, the ABA must discourage outside regulation by thoroughly
analyzing the issues raised by client misconduct and by adopting
rules that balance the duty of loyalty to the client with a duty of
fairness to others. If enough states would then enact these rules,
legislatures and government agencies might find it unnecessary to
experiment with alternative solutions to the client-fraud dilemma.
159.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Preamble (1983).

160. See Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59

L. REV. 689, 690 (1981) (noting that "[f]rom a societal perspective, however, professional codes are desirable only insofar as they serve common goals to a greater extent
than other forms of control, namely market forces or government regulation").
161. Cf Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 1006 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("the American Bar Association's implicit suggestion . . . that the Court find that the
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct should govern an attorney's responsibilities is addressed to the wrong audience. It is for the States to decide how attorneys
should conduct themselves in state criminal proceedings.
162. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1983, § 4, at 16, col. 4.
163. The ABA may raise legal challenges to the government's regulations, but it lacks
any authority to preclude such regulation.
TEX.
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In this manner, the ABA could retain its ability to safeguard the legitimate rights of both attorneys and clients by influencing the
proper scope of the attorney-client privilege.
VI.

PROPOSALS

Having reached the conclusion that the ABA should replace
Model Rule 1.6, this comment offers in this final section general
suggestions concerning the issues the ABA should consider. This
section does not purport to provide a comprehensive discussion of
all of the issues relevant to the client-fraud dilemma; rather, it seeks
to provide proposals for future debate.
The ABA should begin further analysis of the client-fraud dilemma with specific consideration of the attorney's role as advisor.
The Preamble to the Model Rules acknowledges that an attorney may
serve the client as advisor, advocate, negotiator, intermediary, or
evaluator," 6 but Model Rule 1.6 does not distinguish among these
capacities. By distinguishing the advisory role from the advocacy
role, the ABA could focus on the differences and enact rules
designed to best serve the needs of all concerned.' 6 5 For example,
rules applicable to the legal advisor might recognize that the absence of an impartial tribunal forces society to place great reliance
on the legal advisor's good faith. A separate set of ethical rules for
the legal advisor may not fully resolve the client-fraud dilemma, but
would allow the ABA to develop rules applicable outside of the special concerns of the adversary system.' 6 6
Since the attorney's advisory and adversarial roles are not mutually exclusive, the ABA would admittedly confront obstacles if it
attempted to provide separate rules. One example mentioned earlier in this comment concerned the attorney's preparation of a client's registration statement for an upcoming public stock offering
and also representing the same client in ongoing litigation. 16 7 If the
attorney discovers an adverse fact that the statement must include
164. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
165. To a certain extent, the ABA has exercised this option. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF

Rule 3.3 (1983) (defining the attorney's duty of candor toward
the tribunal).
166. A separate set of rules might help alleviate the schism within the legal profession
over the client-fraud dilemma. It is significant that the American College of Trial Lawyers strongly opposed the draft's position on the disclosure of client misconduct. See
Taylor, supra note 131; see also Koskoff, supra note 6, at 261 (describing the discussion
draft's proposals as threatening "to destroy the adversary system and the lawyer-client
relationship").
167. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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but that would compromise the client's litigation position, a conflict
arises between the attorney's duties as advocate and advisor. The
ABA could resolve this conflict by instructing the attorney to protect
only the client's legal interests. In the above situation, the attorney
could not issue a registration statement that omitted the adverse fact
if the law required the fact's disclosure. Hence, the client must decide whether to postpone the public offering or else risk its position
in the current litigation. Society, acting through its securities laws,
forces this decision upon the client. The legal profession's ethical
rules should not permit the client to frustrate society's intent. This
understanding could assist the ABA in drafting separate ethical
rules for the legal advisor.
If the ABA decided to enact ethical rules specifically designed
for the legal advisor, a mandatory duty of withdrawal and a discretionary right of disclosure could form the nucleus of a new approach
to the client-fraud dilemma. This new approach should contain a
provision that allows the legal profession to enforce any new rules
and also to prevent the legal advisor from intentionally remaining
ignorant of the client's illegal conduct. The ABA could accomplish
these goals by requiring the legal advisor to conduct a reasonable
investigation of a client's questionable activities. Some would immediately argue that a duty to monitor a client's conduct places a
significant burden on the legal advisor and casts an unjust suspicion
on the client. To avoid this result, the ABA must draft any duty to
investigate in a manner that does not place an unreasonable strain
on the attorney-client relationship. For example, an ethical rule
could charge the legal advisor with the same duty to investigate the
client's activities as is exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney
practicing in the same area of law.'6 This rule would enable the
legal profession to review an advisor's conduct and to consider any
complexities of the advisor's practices without creating a duty that
other practitioners view as unreasonable. In this manner, the ABA
could establish when an attorney knows or should know of a client's
illegal conduct.
The creation of an affirmative duty to monitor the legality of a
client's questionable behavior would enable the ABA to apply a
mandatory scheme of withdrawal to the client-fraud dilemma. Currently, the ABA's Model Rules recognize certain principles of with168. In the OPM case, for example, Singer Hutner ignored substantial evidence of
OPM's fraudulent conduct. If other New York law firms would have responded to this
evidence by investigating OPM's leases, the rule envisioned by this comment would allow the legal profession to discipline Singer Hutner.
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drawal that could serve as a guide for rules of mandatory
withdrawal. Model Rule 1.16 requires an attorney to withdraw from
representation if "the representation will result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct or other law." '6 9 In addition, Model
Rule 1.16 permits discretionary withdrawal when:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving
the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is
criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetuate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that
the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent .... 170
If an attorney withdraws pursuant to Model Rule 1.16, the attorney
must "take steps to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the
client's interests . . . . ,,7 This rule contains several useful elements, but a rule designed to combat the client-fraud dilemma requires a more detailed and aggressive approach.
The ABA should consider enacting a rule that requires the attorney serving as a legal advisor to withdraw from representation if
the client insists on using the attorney's services to pursue fraudulent or illegal conduct. 1 72 Mandatory withdrawal, combined with a
reasonable duty to monitor a client's conduct, would impose an enforceable ethical duty on the legal advisor and discourage clients
from involving their attorneys in misconduct. At the same time,
however, a rule of mandatory withdrawal must protect the client's
legitimate interests and the attorney's ability to persuade the client
to remain within the law. Thus, a scheme of mandatory withdrawal
should require the legal advisor to meet with the client prior to the
termination of the attorney-client relationship. This meeting would
allow the client to correct any erroneous judgment the advisor may
have made in assessing the legality of the client's activities. The
meeting would also give the advisor an opportunity to encourage
the client to refrain from future misconduct and to rectify the consequences of past misconduct. If the client refuses to accept the advi169.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.16(a)(l) (1983).

170. Id. at Rule 1.16(b)(1)-(3).
171. Id. at Rule 1.16(d).
172. Model Rule 1. 16 allows discretionary withdrawal when the client engages in conduct that the attorney finds morally repugnant. The rule proposed in this comment
requires withdrawal, but only if the client engages in fraudulent or illegal activity. To
force an advisor to withdraw when the advisor views a client's conduct as morally objectionable unjustly allows the advisor's moral beliefs to greatly influence the client's
conduct.
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sor's recommendations, the rule should then require the advisor's
withdrawal, with the advisor's taking only those precautions reasonably necessary to protect the client's legitimate interests.' 73 In this
manner, mandatory withdrawal would create a "minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to dis74
ciplinary action." 1

Any proposed solution to the client-fraud dilemma should also
grant the legal advisor the discretion to disclose a client's misconduct when withdrawal alone will not prevent death or substantial
bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interests of
others.' 7 5 Those who oppose disclosure of confidential communications generally express great concern over the effects that unrestrained disclosure could have on the legitimate rights of clients.
The discretionary disclosure envisioned by this comment shares
those concerns and attempts to limit disclosure in a way that balances the client's legitimate interests with several compelling needs
of society. First, the disclosure rule should require the advisor to
terminate the representation pursuant to the mandatory withdrawal
rule prior to any disclosure of client misconduct. Compliance with
the mandatory withdrawal rule limits any potential disclosure to a
situation in which the client has expressly refused to refrain from
fraudulent or illegal activity. Even if the advisor must withdraw
from representation, however, the disclosure rule would deny the
right to disclose unless the client's conduct threatens substantial injury to others. Thus, the proposed disclosure rule would restrict
that right to a relatively narrow set of circumstances. This rule
would not serve as a tool to discipline attorneys; rather, it would
allow the legal advisor to sacrifice a client's fraudulent or criminal
intent to safeguard compelling needs of society.
A mandatory duty of withdrawal and a discretionary right of
disclosure should contain several principles designed to preserve essential functions of the attorney-client privilege. First, the ABA
173. The ABA may also wish to enact a provision that requires the legal advisor who
has prepared for the client any documents that contain false or misleading information
to withdraw those documents. To avoid unjust prejudice to the client, this provision
would give the client the option of withdrawing the documents before the advisor does
SO.
174. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1980).
175. This proposal borrows the language of proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)(l) (Revised
Final Draft 1982). See supra note 127 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes
136-139 and accompanying text (explaining why withdrawal alone is not an effective
solution to the client-fraud dilemma).
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could modify the legal advisor's duty of withdrawal with a de
minimis and harmless consequences exception.' 7 6 This exception
would allow the legal advisor to continue the representation of a
client if the client's misconduct remains insignificant and does not
pose a threat to others. Without such an exception, mandatory
withdrawal would require the legal advisor to terminate representation when a client's continued violation of some minor government
regulation would not harm the interests of others. The vague meaning of "de minimis and harmless consequences," however, could encourage abuse by those attorneys determined to continue
representing clients engaged in significant wrongdoing. For this
reason, any draft of such an exception must avoid creating a broad
loophole for the unscrupulous. If the ABA can accomplish this goal,
insignificant and technical violations of the law would not terminate
an attorney-client relationship.
In addition to an exception for de minimis and harmless consequences, the duty of mandatory withdrawal should also contain a
good faith argument exception. Those who would oppose
mandatory withdrawal might conclude that such withdrawal prevents the legal advisor from challenging unjust, poorly drafted, or
outdated laws. The legal advisor should be relieved of a duty to
withdraw if the advisor can make a good faith argument in support
of the position taken. In an example used earlier in this comment,
the government enacted new food stamp regulations that seriously
jeopardized the operation of a merchant's business. 1 7 7 Under a
good faith argument exception, the legal advisor could avoid withdrawal and could assist the merchant in challenging the legality and
enforceability of the new regulations.
This exception could also have indirect application to the advisor's discretionary right of disclosure. For example, the advisor
withdraws after attempting to fit the client's conduct within the
good faith argument exception. Although the conduct represented
a close case, the attorney nevertheless determines that a good faith
argument does not support the conduct's legality. The closeness of
this determination could encourage the advisor not to disclose the
client's conduct because someone else might succeed in construct176. See Lorne, supra note 74, at 490:
When there is relatively little involvement of the advisor in an improper activity, either because the involvement is slight or the impropriety is unclear, and
the social harm is not perceived or substantial, the advisor should be permitted
to resign but only if to do so will not operate to the disadvantage of the client.
177. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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ing a good faith argument. Thus, the exception would protect the
client's legitimate interests and would allow the attorney to participate in the continued development of the law.
In summary, client misconduct poses an ethical dilemma which
the legal profession has failed to resolve. This failure has exposed
the legal profession's vulnerability to government regulation and
demonstrated a need for the ABA to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the client-fraud dilemma. This comment has presented several suggestions for a set of rules to guide the legal advisor when
confronting client misconduct. These suggestions attempt to create
an ethical scheme that encourages clients to refrain from fraudulent
or illegal activity without restricting the client's ability to secure
zealous legal representation. The ABA should consider these and
similar proposals to provide an effective solution to the client-fraud
dilemma.
KENNETH
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